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award/ to a ruling that the asserted patent is partly or entirely invalid, 8 or even unenforceable,' with the patent owner ordered to pay the infringement defendant's attorneys' fees. 10 And the complexity and potential intensity only increase when multiple patents, multiple accused products, or both are involved. The associated pressures seem, on occasion, to lead litigants and trial lawyers to succumb to the temptation to step outside the bounds of vigorous advocacy.' ' The trial judges in each of the IP cases discussed herein wrestled with the issue of whether certain litigation tactics crossed the line between advocacy and abuse. The decisions contend with a range of conduct, occurring at various phases of litigation. In several, the trial courts' decisions to sanction were reversed or modified on appeal or reconsideration. Accordingly, these cases shed light on a question which challenges courts, litigants, and trial counsel: when it comes to zealous advocacy, 12 how much zeal is too much zeal?
13
Where to draw the line can be a challenging question. And the stakes are high. Courts have the power to impose a wide variety of sanctions on parties and their counseL 14 The lawyers involved risk injury to their reputations and even, potentially, bar discipline." Following an overview of the key sanctions regimes available to the federal courts, this paper draws on some recent IP decisions examining litigation conduct to illustrate the range of conduct with which courts must contend and the application of various sanctions frameworks. It concludes with a discussion of the relationship between litigation misconduct and state and U.S. Patent and 10 See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text n See Riedinger, supra note 3, at 1261 ("Because litigation -like most legal practice -is based upon an honor system, IP litigation produces great temptation to shave ethical comers."). 12 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 2 (2011) ("As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules ofthe adversary system."). 13 Although sanctions for litigation misconduct are available against both parties and counsel under various provisions and legal theories, the primary focus of this paper is the conduct of counseL Accordingly, the decisions selected for discussion herein involved trial court rulings sanctioning counsel for litigation misconduct or rulings against parties for conduct involving the participation of counsel.
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Trademark Office (USPTO) ethics rules, and the potential ethics fallout from litigation conduct that crosses the line.
I. SANCTIONING MISBEHAVIOR IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES
Parties and their counsel can be sanctioned under Fed. R. Civ. P. I I for "presenting"-including "later advocating"-pleadings or other papers that include allegations unsupported by law or evidence. 16 As illustrated by the cases discussed below, however, some recent IP litigation has generated significant sanctions litigation implicating other law governing misconduct in federal court, 17 including some law specific to patent cases. By way of background, discovery misconduct, such as unjustifiably certifYing disclosures as complete or otherwise evading disclosure obligations, can be punished pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(gi 8 Every disclosure Wider Rule 26(a)(l) or (aX3) and every discovery request, response, or objection must be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's own name-----or by the party personally, if unrepresented-and must state the signer's address, e-mail address, and telephone number. By signing, an attorney or party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, infonnation, and belief fanned after a reasonable inqui1y:
(A) with respect to a disclosure, it is complete and correct as of the time it is made; and (B) with respect to a discovery request, response, or objection, it is: (i) consistent v.rith these rules and warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifYing, or reversing existing law, or for establishing new law, (ii) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and (iii) neither tmreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the action.
Regarding sanctions, FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3) provides:
If a certification violates this rule without substantial justification, the court, on motion or on its own, must impose an appropriate sanction on the signer, the party on whose behalf the signer \vaS acting, or both. The sanction may include an order to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the violation.
19 FED. R. CN. P. 37(c)(l XA)-{C) provides in relevant part: [VoL 52:225 An attorney "who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously" can be sanctioned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 20 And the federal courts also have the "inherent power" to sanction patties and counsel for bad-faith litigation conduct. 21 Attorney fee awards are available under each authority 22 In patent and trademark cases found "exceptional [,] " "prevailing part[ies]" may be awarded "reasonable attorney fees." 23 In addition, as noted below, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has recently held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in considering litigation misconduct as one factor justifYing an award of enhanced damages pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284? 4 
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!!. EXAMPLES OF RECENTLY SANCTIONED CONDUCT
Attorney conduct in some IP cases has generated some eye-catching headlines of late, including reports relating to sanctions in the form of enhanced damages, attorneys' fee awards, and even potential jail time to punish aggressive tactics on the patt of litigation counseL For example, trial judges have rebuked counsel for: Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United
States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfY personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct. 21 See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991) (upholding the inherent authority of the federal courts to impose sanctions, including attorney fees, for bad faith litigation conduct). 22 See supra notes 18-21. 23 According to 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012) However, that misconduct was one factor in the court's decision to award $40 million to the plaintiff in enhanced darnages.
40
In i4i, the court considered the conduct of Microsoft's trial counsel to be relevant to whether i4i, the prevailing patentee, was entitled to enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C. § 284.
41 After discussing a number of factors relevant to the issue of enhancement,' 2 the court stated "also favoring enhancement is Microsoft's counsel's litigation conduct, specifically during trial." 43 Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court. When the damages are not found by ajmy, the court shall assess them. In either event the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.
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dire and continued through closing arguments, despite the court's repeated admonitions and warnings:
Throughout the course of trial Microsoft's trial counsel persisted in arguing that it was somehow improper for a non-practicing patent owner to sue for money damages. He further persisted in improperly trying to equate i4i's infringement case with the current national banking crisis implying that i4i was a banker seeking a "bailout."
These improper arguments were made in spite of the Court's warnings. Microsoft's trial counsel began voir dire by asking the following question to the jury panel:
So an example might be that somebody has a patent that they're using not to protect a valuable product but someone's copying, but because they are attacking somebody because they just want to try to get money out of them. So it fits, for example, with the litigation question Mr. Parker asked. So if somebody felt that~ let's take this case for an example. If somebody felt that the patents were being used in a wrong way, not to protect a valuable product but a wrong way, could you find that patent invalid or noninfringed?
In response, the Court sua sponte had counsel approach the bench and outside the hearing of the jury asked:
TilE COURT: I understand that you just told the jury if somebody was using the patent not to compete, that that was the wrong way to use the patent? 53 It suspended the sentence pending the completion of the trial, and ruled that the sentence would be considered discharged if the attorney violated no further orders. 54 At the hearing, the court reserved the separate issue of an appropriate sanction against the attorney's client-BiTEK-and set forth its analysis regarding that issue in its subsequent order. 55 Preliminarily, the court held that BiTEK, too, should be sanctioned, for "undermin[ing] the parties' expectations to a trial by a jnry selected from the panel sununoned according to the regular process of the court. "
56 The court set forth two goals it hoped to achieve via the sanctions: "curing the prejudice caused by the violation and deterring future litigants from violating the court's orders in limine. ' 66 With regard to BiTEK's complaint about being held to account for its counsel's conduct, the court said "the finding that BiTEK was acting through its counsel comports with the well-settled principle that a client is responsible for its attorney's conduct in the courtroom.'' 67 It acknowledged that "[t]he exclusion of expert testimony .. . did hamper BiTEK's ability to present its noninfringement theory through the witness it desired[,]" but indicated that such a consequence was necessary to fulfill "the deterrent effect of the sanction."
68 It also rejected BiTEK's contention that monetary sanctions sufficed to compensate 02 Micro and deter future misconduct, noting the district court's concern that otherwise, a litigant could "buy a new jury panel" via in limine violations.
69
This case illustrates the careful tailoring of sanctions to particular circumstances, the use of sanctions to both compensate and deter, and the potential for the conduct of counsel to injure his or her own client.
The conduct of a litigation attorney for infringement defendant Cisco Systems, Inc. reportedly prompted a Marshall, Texas federal magistrate judge to offer to entertain a new trial motion on the part of Commil USA, the patentee. 70 The attorney, Otis Carroll, was accused of seeking to play to potential anti-foreign bias by asking the jury to reject the infringement claim so that Commil's President Jonathan David "won't fly back home [ Magistrate Judge Chad Everingham promptly issued a curative instruction to the jury, stating: "Sometimes when a lawyer injects irrelevant information into a case it's because he perceives a weakness in the merits of his case. I don't know whether that's why it happened in this case, but you can consider that as you're evaluating the testimony and the evidence in this case."
74 But after the jury carne back with a $3.7 million verdict-far short of the $53 million the patentee had requested-the magistrate judge expressed concern about the effect of the remark on the jury, and invited the new trial motion.
75
The court granted Commil's new trial motion, concluding "that Cisco's counsel's statements regarding religious preference were improper and that the jury's verdict was inconsistent with substantial justice." 
Kellogg v. Nike, Inc.
78 is a fourth recent patent case in which the trial court was concerned about remarks of counsel during trial, but this time the statements related to the merits. In this design patent case, the court had ordered in limine that "any argument or evidence that was inconsistent with the ... claim construction would be irrelevant," and gave specific guidance regarding terms counsel could and could not use to refer to the accused products during a hearing immediately before trial 79 In its order on posttrial motions, including the plaintiffs request for attorney fees, the court 73 
Miriam Rozen, Pork Remark in Patent Case Prompts Magistrate to Say He Will Entertain New
Trial Motion, TEXAS LAW. BLOG (May 24,2010,4:17 PM) http://texaslawyer.typepad.com/texas_lawye r _ blog/20 1 0/05/pork-remark-in-patent-case-prompts-magistrate-to-say-he-will-entertain-new-trial-motio n.html. 74 
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cited several instances at trial 80 in which the defendant "repeatedly attempted to reintroduce and reargue theories rejected by the Court in the claim construction order and the order on motions in limine. "
81 According to the court: "The conduct proscribed by those orders was clear. Nike' s misconduct occurred throughout the trial and Kellogg preserved objections to much of the misconduct." 82 The court found that:
Nike's conduct at trial and throughout this litigation revealed a strategy calculated to misdirect the jury's focus from the proper comparison of the patented design to the design on Nike's accused hats to an improper comparison of the whole hats shown in Kellogg's patent to Nike's accused hats. Nike made attempts to lead the jury to a product-to-product comparison that was contrary to established law and to the court's instructions. Nike was obliged to either accept the court's claim construction ruling as the law of the case or to proceed with an interlocutory appeaL Instead, Nike chose to pursue a strategy of distorting the court's claim construction and attempting to lead the jury to an improper interpretation of the claimed invention that would correspond to its proposed, but rejected, claim construction.
83
Nevertheless, the court declined to order a new trial on the ground that its "instructions . . . served to obviate any prejudice to Kellogg's case occasioned by Nike's lapses." 84 The court did, however, rule that Nike's conduct-its "strategy of giving superficial recognition to the court's claim construction rulings, while continuing to press its own interpretation of the claim," combined with its "conduct in asserting and pursuing [its] claim of invalidity," after having sought and obtained dismissal of its invalidity counterclaim on the eve of trial 85 ---eonstituted "vexatious conduct" warranting a finding of exceptionality under 35 U.S. C. § 285, an award of attorney fees and costs reasonably related to the invalidity claim, and a denial of an award of costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 in favor of Nike, despite the jury's verdict in its favor. 86 Ultimately, plaintiff Kellogg was awarded in excess of $400,000 in attorney fees and costs on account of defendant's misconduct 87 The Federal Circuit summarily affirrned. One of the more exotic reports, oflate, of discovery-related misconduct appears in a Special Master's report in patent litigation involving St. Clair Intellectual Property Consultants Inc. and Canon Inc. over digital camera technology. 89 According to the report, Canon had a consulting agreement with a third party, Mirage Systems, Inc., under which "Mirage agreed to help Canon establish that Mirage was the rightful owner of the patents at issue in the case, and not to assert those patents against Canon" in exchange for a payment (from Canon to Mirage) of $75,000, in addition to reimbursements for expenses and '"lost time,"' for a total of$167,693.97. Moreover, attorneys for St. Clair asserted that Canon improperly failed to disclose the agreement during discovery, and the Special Master concluded that that failure was "unjustified and fraudulent." 93 As a result, the Special Master recommended the revocation of the pro hac vice admissions of Canon's counsel, as well as a ban on the participation of that firm in future proceedings in the matter at hand 94 
III. SANCTIONS AWARD REVERSALS
The above-summarized decisions illustrate that recent IP cases have involved a wide range of sanctioned conduct. More examples follow. However, in each of the following cases, the sanctions order was subsequently reversed or revised, either on reconsideration or appeal. Some questions raised by these decisions are explored below. But first, the decisions are summarized. 
Trial Lawyers in Trouble 239
A. Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.
The challenges of discovery compliance and of detecting noncompliance are well-known:' The complexities, burdens, and opportunities associated with electronic discovery have multiplied those challenges 96 Recent orders sanctioning parties and counsel for discovery-related misconduct in IP cases illustrate the power of the temptation to withhold damaging information-electronic or not.
The serious nature of the misconduct at issue and the magnitude of the sanctions award in Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp 97 were both eyepopping. On January 7, 2008, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California issued an order finding that Qualcomm had "intentionally withheld tens of thousands of documents ... requested in discovery"-documents which "directly contradicted a key argument advanced by Qualcomm in pretrial motions and throughout trial and supported a defense asserted by Broadcom." 98 It also found that "six attorneys assisted Qualcomm in withholding the critical documents by failing to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the adequacy of Qualcomm's document production and by ignoring warning signs, which indicated that the document search was not thorough and that Qualcomm's document production was not complete." 99 The court imposed monetary sanctions on Qualcomm in the amount of $8.5 million, 100 and referred the attorneys to the California State Bar for investigation and possible discipline.
101
A critical issue in the case was whether Qualcomm waived its right to enforce its patents against Broadcom by participating in a technology standards-setting organization known as the "JVT." 102 In its opinion affirming the trial court's finding that Qualcomm's litigation misconduct was sufficient justification for its exceptional case determination, 103 the Federal Circuit described the conduct at issue as follows: On April 2, 2010, however, after granting the six attorneys "an almost unlimited opportunity to conduct discovery and to present new facts," the trial court decided not to impose sanctions on the six attorneys, concluding that they "made significant efforts to comply with their discovery obligations."
105 It maintained, however, that "this massive discovery failure resulted from significant mistakes, oversights, and miscommunication on the part of both outside counsel and Qualcomm employees," 106 and summarized a number of those errors in its Order Declining to Impose Sanctions Against the Responding Attorneys and Dissolving the Order to Show Cause, including: 115 Weiss, supra note 114 (quoting a second Qualcomm discovery attorney, stating "'I think the takeaway is that this kind of thing can happen to anybody."'). Patent owner Richard Haase and his exclusive licensee, ClearValue, sued Pearl River and several other defendants for patent infringement and trade secret misappropriation.ll8 Whether the wastewater treatment polymers Pearl River sold had molecular weights over one million was a "critical issne" in the case, 119 and the defendants sought the production of the results of any molecular weight tests the plaintiffs had run on Pearl River's products 120 The plaintiffs objected to the request as burdensome and '"seeking work product or trial preparation materials that are not discoverable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,"' but did not provide the defendants with a privilege log listing any test results.
121
Ultimately, it came to light that the plaintiffs had tested Pearl River's products, and that those products had a molecular weight of "substantially below the one million limitation" in the patent at issue.
122
Further, the plaintiffs' expert had reviewed the test results.
123 Thus, no work product protection applied 124 And, the plaintiffs' counsel, Gordon Waggett, had been a party to the email exchanges between the patent owner and the expert relating to the test results.
125
According to the trial court, only the '"ultimate sanction"' of dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims was appropriate, given the critical nature of the withheld information and the fact that the information was suppressed for over a year and a half.
126
It struck the plaintiffs' pleadings, entered judgment for the defendants, and awarded the defendants attorney's fees, costs, and expenses in excess of$2.7 million incurred over the period of the violation, 127 In so holding, the trial court implicitly rejected the attorney's excuse "that he had a 'total disconnect' with respect to the testing ... 'was sorry' for not producing the test results ... because he now appreciated he was 'obviously wrong' and that the results were 'not work product"' and that "he was 'rusty' and had 'been out of the litigation loop' for almost nine years."
132 Undermining this testimony, in the view of the trial court, was the fact that following the email exchange between the patent owner and the expert, on which the attorney was copied, the attorney wrote to the patent owner and instructed him to "stop copying [the expert] to 'best preserve priv/work product.
134 It concluded that the conduct at issue was "less egregious" than discovery violations the Fifth Circuit had held did not justify dismissal. 135 Consequently, the defendants were no longer "prevailing part[ies]" eligible for attorney's fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and costs under 28 U.S. C. § 1920 and, accordingly, those awards were reversed, as well. 136 However, in upholding the district court's ruling that the conduct of the plaintiffs and their counsel was sanctionable, the Federal Circuit specifically identified the violation ("they withheld test results reviewed by a testifying expert"); deferred to the trial court's evaluation regarding the credibility of the patent owner, the expert, and the attorney; and upheld the court's "finding that the failure to disclose was not 'hann1ess.'" 137 the failure~ (B) may inform the jury of the party's failure; and (C) may impose other appropriate sanctions, including any of the orders listed in Rule 37(b )(2)(A)(i)-(vi). 
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Although the court recognized that it had erred in declining to grant the defendants' motions for summary judgment, 144 it clearly did not welcome what it described as Medtronic's and MWE's position "that the Court had the obligation to stop any trial conduct that stepped over the line of zealous advocacy [and] that they should not be held responsible for what they were able to get away with during the trial presentation." 145 The court accused Medtronic and its counsel of capitalizing on the particular complexities of patent litigation:
The conduct ofMedtronic and its counsel constituted much more than a few instances of overstepping during a hard-fought battle. This case involved complicated technology. Patent law is complex and not intuitive to the average juror. Parties and counsel have an obligation to refrain from seeking to take advantage of those complexities by employing misleading strategies .... Medtronic's untenable positions and misleading tactics complicated the Court's task of analyzing the legal issues.
146
The Federal Circuit reversed on appeal, however.
147
The court considered each ground the trial court cited for its finding that the case was exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285, and held that none could support that finding. 148 153 This time, the Medtronic companies were defending a patent case, and the court cited their "failure to accept the claim construction governing this case"; adoption of a "defense to infringement ... wholly based on an attempt to obscure, evade, or minimize the Federal Circuit's construction of the patent-in-suit"; 154 and attempt "to mislead both the jury and the Court .... "
155
The Federal Circuit, however, reversed the attorney fees and sanctions award, attributing the trial court's finding of exceptionality (based on the litigation conduct at issue) to a misunderstanding of the relevant law. 156 In overturning the district court's ruling, the appellate panel distinguished between the mere assertion of a defense and the manner in which the defense is litigated.
157
E. Montgomery v. eTreppid Technologies, LLC
The conduct at issue in each of the cases described above appears to have been motivated by a desire to win the client's case. She told the court that the California Superior Court was the only court that had jurisdiction to decide whether the files should be turned over to the Liner firm. This is not true. She told the court that the Montgomery parties had not had an opportunity to argue which state's law should apply as it concerns the client files. This is not true . 
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The magistrate concluded that the above-described conduct was the manifestation of a "litigation strategy to insure--through any means possible-that Mr. Flynn would never be paid and to crush him into submission in the process." 174 She found:
[ Subsequently, upon consideration of the sanctioned firm's and attorneys' objections to the magistrate's ruling, the district judge reversed the sanctions order as to each "without prejudice to any further proceedings consistent with [the district judge's] order with respect to Flynn's motion for sanctions."
179 As to each of Liner Grode, Ms. Pham, and Ms. Klar, however, the reversals were not based on the merits of the magistrate's fmdings that the conduct at issue was sanctionable. 180 Instead, as to Liner Grode, the district judge held that the magistrate had imposed sanctions on Liner Grode only under 28 U.S.C. § 1927,18l and that that provision does not apply to law firms. 182 The district judge reversed the sanctions against Ms. Pham because "the Magistrate Judge's order setting the evidentiary hearing did not advise Pham that she may be subject to sanctions personally [,] " and therefore that the magistrate "did not provide adequate notice to Pham prior to imposing the sanctions in this matter [,] " 183 and similarly concluded as to Ms. Klar 184 Ultimately, the parties agreed to a settlement on the issue of sanctions while appeal was pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
185
In accordance with the Ninth Circuit's order approving the settlement, the district court ordered the sanctions proceedings against Ms. Klar, Ms. Pham, and Liner Grode tenninated. 89 A confidentiality order entered during discovery provided that certain information, including the documents at issue in this case, "'shall not be used [in] any other litigation proceeding,"' and that the district court would retain jurisdiction to enforce those limitations.
190
After the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff decided to voluntarily dismiss the New York action and to refile in the District of Massachusetts. 191 However, the Dorsey attorneys working on the case--Kristan Peters and Marc Reiner-did not mention the pending dismissal during a subsequent conference call with the court and opposing counsel, and Mr. Reiner mailed (instead of emailing) notice of the dismissal to opposing counsel after Ms. Peters instructed him to file the motion (during or shortly after that conference call).
192
Ms. Peters subsequently filed a motion for temporary injunctive relief in the Massachusetts court.
193 Despite the New York court's confidentiality order, she included 115 pages of materials covered by that order with the temporary injunction motion in Massachusetts, and delayed in returning discovery material to the defendants.
194
The defendants moved for sanctions, but then settled with the plaintiff, and withdrew the sanctions rnotion. The district court's language obviously reflects tremendous frustration with the conduct of counsei.
220
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the sanctions against the firm and against Mr. Reiner-the junior parlner on the case--could not stand. 221 The court noted that voluntary dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 is a matter of right under the circumstances of this case, and therefore that the firm was entitled to invoke dismissal even "to flee the jurisdiction or the judge ..
• • "
222 It further held, as to the firm, that "nothing in the record suggests that the decision to permit the Massachusetts filing [of the deposition transcripts covered by the New York confidentiality order] was made by the finn in bad faith or for any improper purpose."
223 As to Mr. Reiner, the appeals panel ruled that the misdirection he employed when cancelling the deposition in question was not sanctionable, 224 nor was sending opposing counsel the notice of dismissal by mail, as "the rules do not make electronic 218 !d.
219 !d. at 549. 220 The district court declined to impose fmancial sanctions, despite what it described as its "ample cause and authority to" do so, because the defendants' sanctions motion was withdrawn after the parties settled, and because the court was "satisfied that the costs incurred by the parties-both financial and emotional~in this case fwereJ significant and sufficient under the circumstances." !d. at 540. Ensuring fundamental fairness is, ultimately, the responsibility of the trial judge. Moreover, the above case summaries can leave no doubt that the conduct of trial counsel in some cases warrants concern and sometimes sanctions. Given this, and the fact that litigation conduct plays out within the purview of the trial judge, if not right before his or her eyes, it is only appropriate that decisions to sanction are vested in the trial court's discretion.
That discretion includes the authority to refer litigation counsel to state bar authorities for investigation and potential discipline. For example, as noted above, the initial sanctions rulings in the Qualcomm and Montgomery cases included referrals of the attorneys involved to their respective state bars for investigation and possible discipline. 230 And the Notes of the Advisory Committee regarding the 1993 revision of Fed. R. Civ. P. II list "referring the matter to disciplinary authorities" among the sanctions a court may impose for its violation.
231
There is no question that litigation misconduct can give rise to ethical violations. As ethics expert Thomas Spahn has noted, the courts and ethics officials sometimes differ regarding the propriety of certain litigation conduct?" He has found that courts seem to be more tolerant than ethics authorities of "arguably 'deceptive' investigative tactics [,] " but "less forgiving than bar officials when considering the scope of lawyers' obligations to disclose adverse case law."
233
With regard to the former, he notes that deceptive investigative conduct-including "hiring investigators to pose as consumers in order to gather evidence of trademark violations and other commercial torts"---<:ould constitute violations of several provisions of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 234 Those rules are:
• Rule 1. 
241
The court found no violation of the ethics rules' prohibition on ex parte contacts, even while acknowledging that the employees qualified as '"represented parties'" under the relevant New York rule.
242
His counterexample, as noted above, concerns an attorney's duty to disclose adverse legal authority, governed by Model Rule 3.3(a)(2).
243
Regarding that obligation, he reports, judges are generally less lenient. 244 The rule bars a lawyer from "fail[ing] to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel [.] " 245 Spahn has traced the history of the ABA's position regarding a lawyer's duty to disclose authority to a tribunal, and notes a "steady [4] to Model Rule 3.3 as reflecting the ABA's current view-that counsel need "disclose only 'directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction. "' 247 Some courts, he indicates, apply a standard that goes as far as requiring the disclosure of any authority which would '"reasonably be considered important by the judge sitting on the case."' 248 The ethics rules apply to the other types of litigation conduct discussed above. Accordingly, in all aspects of litigation conduct, whether citing legal authority or employing investigative techniques, responding to discovery requests or contemplating the assertion of claims or defenses, addressing the jury or characterizing the court's claim construction, careful litigation counsel will endeavor to comply with the most restrictive interpretation of a given requirement. The first step in that analysis is to be familiar with the ethics rules that are particularly relevant to litigation conduct.
In addition to the rules discussed above relating to the disclosure of legal authority to a tribunal and deception, litigation counsel should note the following ethics rules:
• In addition to requiring the disclosure of adverse controlling legal authority, Model Rule 3. These are some key model ethics rules on which most of the states and many federal courts have based rules governing conduct in the courts 254 But IP litigation also occurs in the USPTO, which has its own set of ethics rules 255 and its own disciplinary jurisdiction over registered patent of an exceptional case attorney fees award or a Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions grant may subsequently find himself or herself subject to an OED investigation. 263 But registered practitioners are not the only persons subject to discipline by the USPTO OED. As noted above, all persons who practice before the USPTO are governed by the USPTO ethics rules and may potentially be called to account before the OED. 264 The Patent Act confers upon the USPTO the power to "govern the recognition and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties before the Office .... " 265 Any attorney who is a member in good standing of the highest court of any state is authorized to represent clients before the USPTO in trademark matters. 266 Thus, the OED has jurisdiction to investigate and punish violations of the USPTO rules relating to the "Representation of Others Before the Patent and Trademark Office" by attorneys representing clients in trademark matters, including trademark opposition and cancellations proceedings.
267
The OED's FOlA Reading Room 268 includes several recent fmal orders relating to disciplinary proceedings brought against unregistered attorneys who had practiced before the USPTO in trademark matters. Several of these matters involved reciprocal cliscipline of attorneys who had been disciplined by state bars. 269 But one, at least, involved charges of neglect of matters (trademark applications) entrusted to the attorney. 270 It is important that attorneys who practice in trademark matters before the USPTO Litigation misconduct takes a toll not just on the parties and their counsel. The sanctions orders discussed above evidence the challenges trial judges encounter in the face of aggressive litigation tactics. Several of the orders discussed herein are very lengthy. They reflect, at least in some cases, an enormous investment of work carefully reviewing the record and applying the applicable standards?
72 Plus, sanctions proceedings are highdrama, high-stakes events that potentially evoke emotions in all involved. It is important to acknowledge the "wear and tear" that overly zealous conduct and sanctions litigation inflict on the courts.
In several recent decisions relating to sanctions in IP cases, judges have described their concerns relating to the conduct of parties and counsel before the courts. In further noting that "[t}he court has devoted many, many hours of time in reviewing the papers filed, reading transcripts of relevant hearings, listening to recordings of hearings, and considering carefully the facts and law before it[,]" id., the magistrate also reminded us of another aspect of the costs that attorney misconduct and the associated sanctions proceedings impose on the system-the diversion of precious court time and resources from the merits of disputes. In some cases, of course, the resource drain goes beyond what the courts and the parties invest in satellite sanctions litigation. When the conduct at issue imperils fundamental fairness, an entire new trial may be necessary. Such situations not only prejudice the offender's opponent; they also injure other parties whose day in court is delayed as a result, as well as the taxpayers who fund the court system. Trial and reviewing courts must also recognize these consequences of litigation misconduct, and should more frequently acknowledge them in sanctions decisions.
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Trial Lawyers in Trouble impeding the desirability and ability of district court judges to control their courtrooms and ensure that substantive arguments are reasonably based.
Many patent suits are brought these days with little chance of success. Appeals to this court from summary judgments of non-infringement based on claim constructions that are affirmed here are testament to the frequency of non-meritorious claims brought in the district courts. Whether those suits are brought because of poor and non-objective appraisals of plaintiffs' prospects or for less worthy motives I do not know. But district court judges are entirely justified, when they encounter frivolous claims and/ or excessively hard-ball tactics, in imposing sanctions on offending parties. They are enforcing respect for the courts and the rights of innocent parties to be free of unjustified claims.
In this case, there certainly were a number of instances during the proceedings below where the court felt that counsel had overstepped its bounds with their arguments. We reversed because, as tellingly explained by Judge Bryson, each incident had explanations that the panel believed While I am dismayed at the way in which many law firms today approach the practice of law, I realize that for the most part it is none of my business and indeed not the business of the judiciary in generaL The fact that partners are at times made and retained for their rainmaking skiils and not for their legal skill, that the number of billable hours is not only the alpha and omega of bonuses but that these hours-or at least the ones that count-often exclude pro bono hours, or that who gets credit for originating a piece of business can throw a firm into turmoil and prompt major internecine struggles, or that the bottom line has eclipsed most 273 Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v_ BrainLAB Medizinische Computersysteme GmbH, 603 F.3d 943, 966-----67 (Fed. Cir. 20IO) (Lourie, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 274 See id. everything else for which the practice of law stands or stood to the extent that the practice of law is now frequently described as a business rather than a profession. While decriable these are as I said really not my concern. Rather, it is the fallout from such conduct, some of which we witnessed here, that ineluctably drives some lawyers and some law firms to the kind of conduct that played out before me at this hearing and that then becomes the business of the courts.
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Judge Lourie and Judge Baer seem to agree that whatever the motivations of the responsible parties, the trial courts have a responsibility to police court proceedings and to act to protect the integrity of those proceedings when confronted with inappropriate tactics. However, even after expressing tremendous frustration and disappointment in the conduct of the counsel in the Montgomery and Wolters Kluwer cases discussed above, each of Nevada District Court Magistrate Judge Cooke and Southern District Court Judge Baer sounded a hopeful note. Magistrate Judge Cooke expressed the "sincere hope that those subject to the sanctions ... will never repeat this misconduct and that they will renew their professional commitment to abide by the highest ideals of the legal profession and the rule of law.'" 76 Judge Baer further took note of the reality that most lawyers conduct themselves in accordance with those ideals:
On a final note, the reader should be clear that I frrmly believe the sentiment expressed in the Craco Report that "the actual level of professionalism brought to bear ... by thousands of lawyers across the state, in court and office, day in and day out, is extraordinarily high." I am hopeful that by casting a ray of light on this anomalous and sanctionable behavior the public and the profession will be better served. 277 Judge Baer's confidence in the majority of attorneys is no doubt wellplaced. Nonetheless, the decisions sununarized herein should serve as sobering examples of how even intelligent, experienced counsel can get caught up in the heat of the battle that is modern intellectual property litigation, the potentially devastating consequences of that conduct, and the importance of koowing and heeding the rules of professional conduct. 
